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Nowadays, throughout Morocco a dynamic process of modernization is embracing 
fertility and nuptial behaviors, family planning, contraceptive use, the role and status of 
women in the family as well as in society, and political orientations, challenging the 
foundations of the patriarchal system. The progression from second to third birth is a 
crucial step in fertility change during fertility transition since the reduction especially 
in third and higher-order births maintains fertility decline. For these reasons, the study 
aims at analyzing the main determinants of third-birth intensities, applying an event-
history analysis to the most recent retrospective Moroccan survey data. The findings 
show that differences among social groups still persist: higher risks of giving birth to 
the third child characterize women with a lower educational level and experiencing a 
rural background. Nevertheless, within the framework of the ongoing process of 
modernization in the country and geared to promote women’s status, all segments of the 
population are rapidly changing their fertility behaviors. Third-birth fertility appears to 
decline monotonically for all educational groups. This suggests that the general drop in 
Morocco is due to general period effects that affect all strata of the population and 
various composition effects where increasingly large groups join the socio-economic 
groups that have the lowest fertility. Moreover, the analysis shows no consistent or 
clear evidence of sex preference among Moroccan mothers in the progression to the 
third child. There seems to be a slight aversion towards having two girls; however, this 
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1. Introduction  
 
The fertility patterns of the South and East Mediterranean shores are very 
different from those of the lowest-low fertility countries of the Northern shore, but 
recently fertility decline has been spreading rapidly in the former region, especially in 
Maghreb (Di Comite and Moretti 1999; Héran 2004).  
My analysis focuses on Morocco, which is nowadays characterized by a decline 
of fertility levels and by important changes in the intermediate determinants. In general, 
if the first phase of fertility transition is marked by an increase in the age at marriage, in 
the long term a diffusion tendency towards the nuclear family plays an even greater role 
for countries in an advanced transitional phase, such as Morocco. Therefore, the 
progression from second to third birth is a crucial component in fertility change, since 
the reduction especially of third and higher-order births maintains the fertility decline 
(Yavuz 2005).  
For these reasons, the study aims at analyzing the main determinants of the 
third-birth intensities of two-child mothers, applying an event-history analysis to the 
most recent Moroccan retrospective survey data.  
Section 2 provides some key aspects of fertility transition in Morocco and states 
the research hypotheses. Section 3 specifies the data and methods used, and describes 
some preliminary descriptive findings. In Section 4, the results are discussed, and the 
final section summarizes and concludes the analysis. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and research hypotheses 
     
Morocco of today is experiencing a dynamic process of modernization, affecting 
fertility and nuptial behaviors, family planning, contraceptive use, the role and status of 
women in the family as well as in society, political orientations, and posing a challenge 
to the very foundations of the patriarchal system (Salvini 1994, Fargues 1995, 2003).  
Until the Sixties, Morocco has kept a typically pre-transitional demographic 
regime, characterized by very high fertility and mortality levels. In the following 
decades, the social, economic, and political evolution of the country as well as the 
consequent impact on people’s mentalities and attitudes towards procreation have 
determined deep demographic changes at each level. In particular, Morocco was close 
to natural fertility in the Sixties, with 6.96 children per woman (CERED 1997). The 
period fertility rate rose in the early Seventies, peaking at 7.40 only to continue an 
unbroken decline since the mid-1970s (Figure 1).   
Especially the Eighties represented the final trigger that was associated with a 
change in Moroccan reproductive behavior under the effect of radical socio-economic 
changes in the country, such as rising women’s educational attainment and participation 
in the labor market, knowledge about and access to contraceptives and strong 
urbanization.  All these factors, together with economic recession (falling phosphate 
prices)
1 and a political/military crisis (tensions in the Sahara) led to a sharp decline in 
                                                 
1 After a temporary sharp increase in phosphate prices in the early 1970s, leading to a boom in 
expenditure, the Moroccan economy ran into major problems in the mid-1970s, as the global recession set 
in phosphate prices collapsed. Export and revenue decline forced the government to raise personal income 
taxes as well as scale back subsidies for health care, education, food subsidies, and housing. The new role   3 
Moroccan fertility, falling to 5.52 in 1982, 4.46 in 1988, 3.28 in 1994, 2.80 in 1999, and 
more recently, 2.50 according to the Demographic and Health Survey of 2003/04 (for 
the three years preceding the survey). In terms of fertility transition, there is no 
uniformity across the country in the change because different sections of the population 
have been affected by social and cultural changes in different ways and at varying pace. 
The trends in urban and rural fertility indicate that some parts of the population are 
already rapidly pointing to below-replacement fertility: according to the last DHS, the 
TFR was 2.10 in urban areas and 3.00 in rural settings (Figure 1).  
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Source: own calculations based on Moroccan Statistical Office data, various years. 
 
 
As it is well documented in the literature, the gradual decline of fertility levels in 
Morocco depends on the joint action of several factors. Especially increasing 
educational standards are traditionally considered an essential determinant of the 
changes in women’s reproductive choices. It is generally argued that female education 
represents the keystone to the transition from traditional fertility regime to modern ones 
(Fargues 1988, 1995). Until the mid-1970s, the commonly held view was that fertility 
fell uniformly with education. This view was consonant with the classic model of 
demographic transition, which hypothesizes steady fertility decline concurrent with a 
process of socioeconomic development. Education then seems to remove the 
divergences in fertility among different countries; such differences continue to be high 
only for illiterate women, they are still perceptible for women with a low to medium 
level of education, and are negligible for the better educated ones (Fargues 1988). 
However, an extensive review of the available empirical evidence up to the late 1970s 
casts doubts on these long-held assumptions (Cochrane 1979). The expected inverse 
association was not found in many poor, mostly illiterate, rural societies. Instead, an 
inverted U-shaped relationship was documented in several developing countries. As it 
has clearly been underlined by Courbage (1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1999), the relationship 
                                                                                                                                          
of government was not as a giver but as a taker of incomes, and it drove a renewed imperative: family 
self-reliance (Courbage 1995, Deane Abernethy 2002).   4 
between education and fertility appears extremely changeable depending on the 
countries and, especially in the Mediterranean macro region, it sometimes reveals deep 
ambiguities, in particular in the Arabic countries, such as Syria, Egypt, and Kuwait. In 
general, it can be argued that the impact of individual schooling on reproductive 
behavior varies over countries depending on the stage they are at in the fertility 
transition: the effect is weak in mostly illiterate societies, it grows stronger as societies 
improve their overall education and advance in their transitional phase – such as 
Morocco –, and it becomes less prominent again in societies that have just passed the 
fertility transition, and once a relatively low level of fertility has been reached. In 
Morocco, girls who reach a secondary level of schooling are more likely to delay 
marriage and childbearing, their children tend to be healthier and their participation in 
the labor force is relatively higher (CERED 1997, 1998). 
Education affects the quantum and tempo of fertility partly through its impact on 
age at marriage (Smith 1983). Because in most developing countries in general, and in 
Morocco in particular, childbearing takes place within the context of conjugal union, 
and nuptiality patterns are closely linked to fertility patterns, marriage and childbearing 
are viewed as interrelated social and demographic events, and as sequential phases in 
the life cycle of women. Thus, a higher female age at marriage and later family 
formation thereby are factors that have significantly contributed to depress fertility in 
Morocco. In fact, higher age at marriage reduces the average interval of procreation 
because of the contraction of the exposure period to childbearing. In particular,  the 
average age of women at first marriage, which was 18.8 according to the Moroccan 
Demographic and Health Survey of 1992, rose to 21.4 according to the last 
Demographic and Health Survey of 2003/04 (Azelmat, Ayad, and Abdelmoneim 2005). 
The rarefaction of some very common familial models, such as polygamy and 
repudiation, which encouraged high fertility in the past, can also be considered a pivotal 
aspect in the decline of Moroccan fertility, as well as the progress achieved in maternal 
and infant mortality, because the perceived increase of survival should lead to lower 
fertility.  
In addition, reproductive behavior is changing as the result of strong 
urbanization in the country, a process from which arouses the preference towards 
smaller families. Urbanization implies, from a demographic point of view, the 
concentration of the population in urban areas, and from a sociological point of view, 
the diffusion of “urban behaviors”: individualism, isolation, anonymity, and 
competition; features which lead to families less extended and to a weaker patriarchal 
system.  
The effect of governmental actions aimed at decreasing the fertility level has 
significantly contributed to the diffusion of contraceptive methods and to the 
improvement in the female status, having a strong effect on fertility transition. It is 
generally argued that family planning programs are successful only if they jointly act 
with important socio-economic changes, promoting women’s status and arousing the 
desire to limit the family size (Mason 1985). All these factors have contributed to push 
women’s emancipation from their traditional role of being wives and mothers to 
enhance women’s position within the family authority structure, and to promote the 
development of the decisional autonomy, playing a major role in shaping fertility 
behavior.  
In the inception and the rapid crossing of the transitional process, and in the 
diffusion of low fertility, the indirect effect of international migration on the mentality   5 
of non-migrants as well as on the whole society of origin may also have played an 
important role.  Openness to the outside world, and notably to extranational living 
models and customs through international migration, may contribute to differences in 
fertility rates, thanks to relationships with emigrants and the mass media.  As Courbage 
puts it, “La migration internationale, ses apports en capitaux, génère une 
intensification agricole qui incite au calcul économique plus sophistiqué et à des 
stratégies familiales adaptées: moins d’enfants mais mieux formés, par exemple. De 
surcroît, par un effet de mimétisme, la migration internationale a des effets en boule de 
neige. Les familles de non-migrants, doivent, pour ne pas perdre leur statut social, 
trouver des alternatives viables et évoluer”  (2001, page 474).  
Therefore, the reproductive choices are clearly a reflex action both of cultural 
and socioeconomic factors. Substantial developmental changes have occurred over the 
last decades in Morocco owing to many factors that are generally believed to be 
conducive to fertility decline. 
However, even though unequivocal signs confirm that a multidimensional 
process of modernization is taking place in Morocco, this process seems to be 
diversified in terms of speed and determined by the stratifications still persisting in the 
population, specifically in terms of economic well-being, education, residence, and the 
gender system (Barsotti and Lecchini 2003; Paterno, Gabrielli, and D’Addato 2006).  
Thus, I would like to see through an analysis of current individual data whether 
or not there are “pioneer” subgroups with low fertility, e.g. higher educated women or 
women who have been brought up within an urban context. 
On the basis of the literature, I expect that the status of women impacts 
reproductive behavior, causing differentiated risks for third birth. I am specifically 
interested in verifying the hypotheses that postponement of marriage, spacing of births, 
increased educational standards, and an urban background lead to a higher propensity to 
establish smaller families. In addition, according to previous studies couples in many 
countries express a decided preference for children of a particular sex and their 
preference is attributable to a variety of social, economic, and cultural factors 
(Makhlouf Obermeyer 1996, 1999; Clark 2000; Dalla Zuanna and Leone 2001). A 
strong preference for children of a particular sex may be a significant obstacle to 
fertility decline if couples who have already reached their desired family size continued 
childbearing to try for a child of the preferred sex (Da Vanzo and Starbird 1991). 
Preference towards a son is prevalent in many regions of the world, but the preference 
for a balanced number of daughters and sons is also common; even where the son 
preference is strong, couples usually express a desire to have at least one child of each 
sex (Makhlouf Obermeyer and Cardenas 1997). For example, analyzing Demographic 
and Health Surveys from 26 countries, Arnold (1992) reports that the most common 
pattern of sex-preference is for at least one son and one daughter. Contraceptive use in a 
number of countries also shows preference for a balanced number of sons and 
daughters, often along with a moderate son preference (for example, in Kenya, Morocco 
and Tunisia). When related to fertility transition, one may want to argue that the 
evidence of possible sex preferences should be strengthened as family size decreases 
and third-birth progression increasingly becomes a deliberate choice. Thus, gender 
composition may play a large role within a low-fertility setting, such as contemporary 
Morocco
2. 
                                                 
2 Yet, the preference towards a son may also be related to subcultures existing in the country: Morocco 
has predominantly Berber regions; it is not a homogeneously Arab nation. If the parental gender   6 
3. Data, preliminary findings, and methods 
     
The analysis is carried out using data from the most recent retrospective survey, 
l’Enquête sur la Population et la Santé Familiale (EPSF) 2003/04, conducted in 
Morocco as part   of the Demographic and Health Surveys (Azelmat, Ayad, and 
Abdelmoneim 2005). It was designed to provide information on the fertility levels and 
trends, infant and child mortality, family planning, and mother and child health of a 
nationally representative sample of the Moroccan population. The survey was fielded 
between October 2003 and February 2004. Face-to-face interviews were carried out in 
11513 households and involved 16798 women: all women aged 15 to 49 who were 
present in the household in the night before the interview or who generally lived in the 
household were eligible to take part in the survey. A weighted, multi-stage, stratified 
cluster sampling approach was used in the selection of the sample.  
A first glance at the progression to third birth in Morocco shows significant 
differentials in behavior according to some socio-demographic characteristics of women 
and their husbands, such as the educational level
3, the childhood place of residence, and 
the sex composition of children born previously (Table 1).  
Constant higher proportions of literate women, married to highly educated men 
and having lived in urban settings, who have not experienced third birth 5 and 10 years 
after second child birth, suggest that the more emancipated strata of the population 
postpones higher order births. Thus, the preliminary outcomes highlight the complexity 
of the picture, revealing marked differences in the transition to third birth among the 
population subgroups. By contrast, rather balanced percentages of mothers who have 
never experienced third child birth 5 and 10 years into the second birth, by the sex 
composition of the previous children, may suggest an attenuated effect of this variable 
on reproductive behaviour. 
Basic socio-economic and demographic characteristics of women – related to the 
cultural context of fertility behavior – are investigated, using a piecewise constant 
intensity regression model on the probability of having a third birth. Because marriage 
is almost universal in Morocco and practically all births occur within marital unions, my 
analysis focuses on a sub-sample consisting of 5,645 currently married women (married 
only once) aged 15 to 49 who have already given birth to the second child at the time of 
interview (excluding cases with twins at second birth), and who were at risk of birth 
(starting 8 months after second child birth)
4. Particularly, a woman’s third-birth risk is 
defined as the probability that she will experience third birth the next month, given her 
individual and couple characteristics and given that she has not had such birth by the 
beginning of the month. Risks are assumed to be constant within each time interval but 
may vary across such intervals. In my analysis, the process time (i.e. the baseline 
hazard) is the number of months elapsed since the birth of the second child. Next, I 
include a time-varying covariate aiming to capture the influence of changes in the socio-
                                                                                                                                          
preferences are stronger among Arab populations than they are among the Berber population, as it has 
been suggested, then the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the country may weaken the degree of the son 
preference (Makhlouf Obermeyer and Cardenas 1997). A thorough examination of the differences 
between the Arab and Berber nation, however, would require a careful mapping of the settlement patterns 
of the two groups. The data, however, are not well suited to this purpose and such analysis is beyond the 
scope of the present study. 
3 The inclusion of the highest level of education ever reached is justified by the assumption that women 
and men have already concluded their education career at the time of second birth. 
4 The exposures have a median age of 27.1 years.   7 
political environment on third-birth intensity. I use three time periods in this 
categorization: until 1993, from 1994 to 1998, and from 1999 to the date of interview. 
My choice is motivated by the following reasons: (a) in 1993, the first royal reform of 
the Personal Status Code (Mudawwana, officially issued in 1957) was introduced, (b) in 
1998, the “Plan national pour l’intégration de la femme au développement” was 
launched, and (c) in 1999, Muhammad VI, a liberal sovereign, was enthroned, with the 
declared intention to pursue democratic reform, improve women’s conditions and assure 
human dignity
5. These broad legal reforms are expected to have given women more 
choice in matters of reproduction and contributed to compress the family size. In fact, 
the strategies that are used by the state to consolidate its power have profound 
implications on the female status. In the countries of the Maghreb, for instance, the 
status of women reflects the different processes of state formation, and is, to a large 
extent, a function of the relationship between the state and existing kinship structures 
(Charrad 1990). 
Even though the Moroccan Demographic and Health Survey includes a wide 
range of retrospective questions on birth histories and contraceptive use of women, most 
background characteristics were not collected with individual life histories (e.g. 
information on migration, employment, and the family cycle were obtained only at the 
time of the survey). It was almost impossible, then, to examine these variables in 
conjunction with preceding births and to regard them as explanatory variables due to the 
risks of performing an anticipatory analysis (Hoem 1996).  
The sub-sample used in this analysis indicates that around 70% of the women 
and half of their husbands have no formal education. This is consistent with Moroccan 
schooling levels. With regard to the urban-rural distribution of the Moroccan mothers 
included in the analysis, about 66% lived in rural areas during their childhood, 
reflecting the low levels of urbanization in the country in the past. Half of the two-child 
women got married early, i.e. by the time they reached 19 years of age, and for nearly 


















                                                 
5 The official issue of the new Family Code on 9
th February 2004 is characterized by the direct 
involvement of Muhammad VI.   8 
Table 1: Transition from second to third birth, by selected socio-demographic 
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which 50% of 
women 
experienced 
3rd child birth 
(years) 
Childhood place of  
residence      
Rural 19.4  7.0  1.8  2.7 
Urban 43.2  21.5  2.5  4.4 
Woman's educational 
level      
No education  16.2  6.1  1.8  2.5 
Primary   35.3  12.9  2.2  3.8 
Secondary and higher   53.4  26.8  3.0  5.3 
Partner's educational 
level      
No education  15.7  5.8  1.7  2.5 
Primary   25.3  9.2  2.0  3.1 
Secondary and higher   44.0  21.5  2.0  4.4 
Sex composition of 
children born 
previously      
Two girls  23.4  8.7  1.9  2.9 
One boy and a girl  24.1  10.1  1.9  2.9 
Two boys  23.8  9.9  1.9  2.8 





The model parameters, produced as maximum-likelihood estimates, are 
presented in the form of relative risks (Table 2). As expected, later marriage is 
associated with lower third-birth intensity, although the decrease seems to be quite 
marginal. The model has also been controlled for the length of the previous birth 
interval: short intervals between the first and the second child are associated with higher 
transition rates, while long intervals are associated with lower ones.  
The childhood place of residence and the educational composition of the 
population are two important predictors of fertility change: those who spent their 
childhood in a rural context and those who have a lower level of education are 
characterized by a higher transition rate from the second child to the third. In Morocco, 
female education in particular appears to be a determinant aspect in the course of 
fertility, regardless of the socio-economic. Greater female access to education and 
greater educational opportunities (although these are wider in urban areas) are 
significant, and schools are also important agents of socialization, playing a crucial role   9 
in shaping attitudes, opinions, and values. Not only women but also husbands’ higher 
educational standards significantly impact the propensity of giving birth to the third 
child. The results in the model show that the risk of having the third child decreases at a 
similar intensity both for better educated women and men – with primary schooling as 
well as with secondary education – compared to the least educated subgroups. The U-
shaped relationship between education and fertility documented in several developing 
countries is not found; instead, it seems that fertility falls uniformly as the educational 
attainment of women and husbands rises
6. A model including an interaction term 
between female and male educational levels was finally fitted; the outcomes, however, 
showed no strong and meaningful effects among the categories considered (Table A1 in 
the Appendix). 
As for the calendar period, the first period has the highest progression risk and 
then the risk diminishes at each subsequent level. In the last period, the risk is 46% 
lower than for the period until 1993. Finally, there seems to be a slight tendency 
towards a boy preference in the progression from second to third birth, even if this 
tendency admittedly is not statistically significant. The introduction of the interaction 
between the calendar period and the sex composition of the previous offspring did not 
produce significant results: it rather showed that there is no real interaction at all. The 
results also reveal that none of the differences within calendar periods is significant 
(Table A2 in the Appendix). 
In order to catch the process of fertility declining over time by women’s 
educational level, an interaction model was fitted but the results reveal that all segments 
of population are rapidly changing their fertility behavior; third-birth appears to decline 
monotonically across all educational groups at a similar rate (Table A3 in the 
Appendix). Within the framework of ongoing modernization, even the most “laggard” 
group - such as illiterate women - shows a decrease in third-birth intensity during the 
1990s. The lack of strong interaction between women’s educational attainment and time 
period challenges some of the assumptions on how fertility changes when transition 
advances.  
The author also did not find significant interaction between woman’s 
educational level and the sex composition of children previously born: none of the 














                                                 
6 Note that men’s educational level is a variable reflecting their wives perception, with information not 
directly requested of their husbands.   10 
Table 2: Relative risk (and level of significance) of giving third child birth for two-child 
mothers, standardized by selected socio-demographic characteristics, Morocco, 
2003/04.  
Variables Relative  Risks  p-values 
Age at first marriage      
<20 1.00   
20-22 0.96  0.332 
23-25 0.88  0.013 
>25  0.72 0.000 
Length of previous birth interval     
<2 years  1.00   
2 years or more  0.54  0.000 
Calendar period    
1989-1993 1.00   
1994-1998 0.69  0.000 
1999-2003/04 0.54  0.000 
Childhood place of residence    
Rural 1.00   
Urban 0.77  0.000 
Woman's educational level    
No education  1.00   
Primary   0.85  0.002 
Secondary and higher   0.73  0.000 
Husband's educational level    
No education  1.00   
Primary   0.85  0.000 
Secondary and higher   0.75  0.000 
Sex composition of previous children    
Two girls  1.00   
One boy and a girl  0.95  0.203 
Two boys  0.93  0.067 
Duration since second birth
a)     
<1.50 year  1.00   
1.50-2.49 years  4.15  0.000 
2.50-3.99 years  4.84  0.000 
4.00-5.99 years  4.93  0.000 
6.00-18.50 years  3.09  0.000 
Source: own calculations based on DHS 2003/04, Morocco.  
a) The duration has been computed starting from 8 months following second child birth. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The process of fertility transition is now ongoing in all of the South and East 
Mediterranean countries, so that the present fertility level is about half of that of the 
Seventies. Widely available education and urbanization have influenced reproductive 
behavior and, despite the limited presence of females in the labor market, the 
irreversible drop in fertility is leading to considerable social transformations, such as the 
erosion of the patriarchal system and the promotion of women’s empowerment.   11 
This analysis has focused on Morocco, a country that experiences dynamic and 
multidimensional modernization characterized by the diffusion of the less extended 
family. The progression from second to third birth has been analyzed because it 
represents a pivotal step of family building during advanced fertility transition.  
The findings point out that differences among social groups still persist in 
Morocco: women with a lower educational level and with a rural background display 
higher risks of third child birth. Nevertheless, the analysis has also demonstrated that 
the dynamic process of modernization under way in the country, addressed at the 
promotion of women’s empowerment, acts also on the fertility behavior of women who 
still have a low educational level. Third-birth fertility appears to decline monotonically 
for all educational groups. This suggests that the general drop in Morocco is due to 
general period effects that affect all strata of the Moroccan population and various 
composition effects where increasingly large groups join the socio-economic groups 
that have the lowest fertility. Therefore, if the ongoing trend towards higher female 
educational standards and towards the promotion of their social status continues in 
Morocco, we can expect a smaller number of large families in the close future. 
Women’s position and emancipation are key concerns in implementing further declines 
in the propensity to establish smaller families. A national challenge will be to narrow, 
and eventually eliminate, the persistent wide gaps among the subgroups of the 
population.  
Moreover, the analysis shows no consistent or clear evidence of sex preference 
among Moroccan mothers in the progression to the third child. There seems to be a 
slight aversion towards having two girls, which makes sense as gender composition may 
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Table A1: Relative risk (and level of significance) of giving third childbirth for two-
child mothers, by interaction between woman’s and husband’s educational level, 
standardized by selected socio-demographic characteristics, Morocco, 2003/04. 
Woman’s educational level 
   No education  Primary level  Secondary and 
higher 
Husband’s educational level     
No education  1.00 0.85(0.000)  0.74(0.000) 
Primary   0.72(0.000) 0.67(0.000) 0.67(0.000) 
Secondary and higher   0.72(0.022) 0.57(0.000) 0.44(0.000) 
Source: own calculations based on DHS 2003/04, Morocco. The interaction is controlled for all the other 
factors considered in the model presented in Table 2.  
 
 
Table A2: Relative risk (and level of significance) of giving third child birth for two-
child mothers, by interaction between calendar period and sex composition of previous 
children, standardized by selected socio-demographic characteristics, Morocco, 
2003/04. 
Calendar period 
  1989-1993 1994-1998  1999-2003/04 
Sex composition of 
previous children      
Two girls  1.00 1.00 1.00 
One boy and a girl  0.99(0.781) 0.93(0.402) 0.95(0.538) 
Two boys  0.96(0.468) 0.89(0.267) 0.88(0.151) 
Source: own calculations based on DHS 2003/04, Morocco. The interaction is controlled for all the other 
factors considered in the model presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table A3: Relative risk (and level of significance) of giving third childbirth for two-
child mothers, by interaction between calendar period and woman’s educational level, 
standardized by selected socio-demographic characteristics, Morocco, 2003/04. 
Calendar period 
   1989-1993 1994-1998  1999-2003/04 
Woman’s educational level     
No education  1.00 0.66(0.000)  0.51(0.000) 
Primary  0.79(0.002) 0.60(0.000) 0.47(0.000) 
Secondary and higher   0.58(0.000) 0.54(0.000) 0.42(0.000) 
Source: own calculations based on DHS 2003/04, Morocco. The interaction is controlled for all the other 
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Table A4: Relative risk (and level of significance) of giving third  childbirth for two-
child mothers, by interaction between woman’s educational level and the sex 
composition of previous children, standardized by selected socio-demographic 
characteristics, Morocco, 2003/04. 
Woman’s educational level 
  No education  Primary level  Secondary 
and higher level 
Sex composition of 
previous children     
Two girls  1.00 0.93(0.406)  0.62(0.000) 
One boy and a girl  0.98(0.739) 0.75(0.000) 0.61(0.000) 
Two boys  0.98(0.908) 0.75(0.004) 0.58(0.000) 
Source: own calculations based on DHS 2003/04, Morocco. The interaction is controlled for all the other 
factors considered in the model presented in Table 2.  
 
  
 